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Post by Steve Draper on Jan 4, 2014 7:00:00 GMT -8
Methinks someone who adds games to Tiltyard has recently taken a basic game theory course ;-)
Iterated prisoner's dilemna, iterated chicken, war of attrition, dollar auction...
These are all straight from any course in basic game theory. It will be interesting to see what happens. A player that detects iterated games in particular can probably do useful analysis to help find any Nash equilibriums. Was the motivation for adding these to try to help integrate game-theoretic analysis with useful (simple) test games?
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Post by Sam Schreiber on Jan 4, 2014 9:12:56 GMT -8
Glad you noticed! Yes, I'm definitely curious how GGP players handle these type of games, which are pretty different from connect four, checkers, etc but still fit nicely within the GGP framework. These particular game rulesheets have been around for a few years now but I finally sat down and got them running on Tiltyard.
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Post by Steve Draper on Jan 4, 2014 9:37:07 GMT -8
Glad you noticed! Yes, I'm definitely curious how GGP players handle these type of games, which are pretty different from connect four, checkers, etc but still fit nicely within the GGP framework. These particular game rulesheets have been around for a few years now but I finally sat down and got them running on Tiltyard. I'm thinking detecting iterated (1-step) games should be easy (same legal move set each turn is a pretty strong indicator), and (for instance) calculating and opting for the grim strategy in such games shouldn't be too hard. However, that would only be a best (optimal?) strategy across iterations of the iterated game against the same player wherein the players know who their opponents are, and their past history, which is not the case within the GGP framework, so there is definitely scope for different approaches.
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Post by talinsalway on Jan 6, 2014 14:59:57 GMT -8
My hypothesis, before looking, is that most games will look like repeated defection (about 20 points each), or repeated cooperate-defection (100 to 0 points, approximately). I suspect that most players don't model their opponent too much. Those that do will tend to model their opponent as trying player-score-minimizing, or opponent-score-maximizing. In either case, the equilibrium strategy will emerge, where greedy players will always pick defect, since it's always worth more. Now, to look at the results. Not very many games played so far, and only a few players playing them. The highest min-score is a game between SPlayer and GreenShell, at 44-29. Most games have a player who scores under 20. In general, almost every game has a player who always defects, and a player who usually defects, but sometimes randomly picks cooperate. The decision to cooperate is, I think, likely due to not evaluating fully, rather than modeling the opponent as one who will cooperate. i.e., consider the first game, www.ggp.org/view/tiltyard/matches/8ade3a322ad92ddd7c4e653a8b00e89fc91b4bb2/. kazk always defects (it's the first-order rational thing to do). QFWFQ1 defects 10 times in a row, then decides to start cooperating, then gives up on that. If QFWQ1 was trying to create a cooperative game, they should have cooperated in the first couple moves. I'd be interested in what motivates ggp players to pick cooperate, and whether their authors consider those reasons correct behavior or bugs. I expect it will be several months, at least, until there's even a few 60-60 games, or even near 60-60 games. 'Good' players will tend to defect. In order to justify cooperation, players will need to model their opponents as not only opponent-score-maximizing, but model their opponents as believing that the player is score maximizing. i.e., a player needs to recognize that cooperate-cooperate is better than defect-defect, expect that their opponents recognize it, and expect that their opponents model the player as recognizing it. Then, their opponent needs to actually behave this way. on a related note, it'd be nice to see a 'high score' list for each role in each game, showing who has the high, consistent skill ratings for that role.
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Post by alandau on Jan 6, 2014 23:00:53 GMT -8
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wat
New Member
Posts: 32
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Post by wat on Jun 16, 2014 16:51:47 GMT -8
Cooperation can be rational even for self-regarding agents (i.e. robots trying to climb Tiltyard's ladder). Only it is more complex to calculate sustained cooperation strategies.
Current GGPlayers are heavily biased towards zero-sum Go-like strategies. UCT was born in Computer Go and almost every GPPlayer uses some variation of it.
Someday I'll come up with an improvement to MCTS to cater for hybrid competition-cooperation games. But I'm trying to finish my PropNet first. I suspect sustained cooperation will require analyzing a much bigger part of the game tree and a fast state machine will come in handy.
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wat
New Member
Posts: 32
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Post by wat on Jun 30, 2014 9:16:47 GMT -8
Attempted a trigger strategy robot on Tiltyard yesterday, based on the Folk Theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folk_theorem_%28game_theory%29). It goes minmax against anyone who deviates from maximizing sum of scores of all players (joint profits).
It is performing horribly in 3+ player games. Zero score in every one of them. Going minmax against hardcore defectors leads to suicidal behaviour.
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